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2I. INTRODUCTION
International trade theory is dominated by two major paradigms. One paradigm belongs to the
neo-classical world with constant returns to scale in production (CRS) and perfectly
competitive product markets (PC). The other paradigm rests on the assumption of increasing
returns to scale (IRS) and, in its most prominent formulation, monopolistically competitive
markets (MC). While other important models exist which combine features of both paradigms,
the theoretical and empirical debate has concentrated on these two powerful benchmark cases.
To distinguish between these two paradigms is of more than academic interest. Trade policies,
market integration, migration, and other economic changes may have very different positive
and welfare consequences depending on the underlying paradigm. It is therefore important to
find a way of distinguishing the two paradigms in the data, and to quantify their respective
importance in shaping industrial specialisation patterns. This is the purpose of our study.
In the theoretical part, we develop a discriminating criterion suitable for empirical estimation.
The discriminating criterion relies on the assumption that demand is home biased. It posits that
the home bias influences the pattern of international specialisation in sectors that are
characterised by increasing returns and monopolistic competition while such bias is
inconsequential for sectors characterised by constant returns and perfect competition. We test
this hypothesis in 29 industries, covering 22 OECD countries for 1970-85. Our results suggest
that 17 industries, accounting for about two thirds of industrial output, can be associated with
the IRS-MC paradigm, while 11 industries can be associated with the CRS-PC paradigm. For
one industry the results are inconclusive.
3The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide a selective review of the relevant
literature. Section III sets out our theoretical model and derives the discriminatory hypothesis.
We operationalise this test empirically in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II.  RELATED LITERATURE
II.1 Searching for Evidence of Increasing Returns in Industrial Specialisation Patterns
Several studies have attempted to gauge the relative explanatory power of the two main
paradigms in trade theory directly or indirectly. A first group of studies pertains to the empirical
industrial organisation literature (for reviews see Scherer and Ross, 1990; and Tybout, 1993).
These studies estimate the incidence of plant-level increasing returns directly and generally do
not find them to be pervasive. Estimates of industries’ susceptibility to scale economies were
analysed in conjunction with measures of industrial specialisation across the US states (Kim,
1995) and across EU countries and regions (Brülhart, 1998), and it was diagnosed that “scale-
driven” geographical specialisation was mainly a phenomenon of the past.
A second group of studies focused on intra-industry trade as evidence of the importance of the
IRS-MC paradigm (see Greenaway and Milner, 1986; and, for a critical appraisal, Leamer and
Levinsohn, 1995). Since intra-industry trade was generally associated with IRS-MC models, the
observed large and increasing shares of intra-industry trade were interpreted as evidence of the
growing relevance of non-neoclassical trade models. This evidence became less persuasive
when some studies, like Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and Davis (1995), demonstrated that
intra-industry trade could also be generated in suitably amended versions of the CRS-PC
framework.
4A third approach was to enlist the excellent empirical performance of the gravity equation in
support of the IRS-MC paradigm, since the gravity equation has a straightforward theoretical
counterpart in the IRS-MC model (Helpman, 1987). This view was challenged by studies that
showed that the gravity equation can also arise in a variety of other models (Davis and
Weinstein, 1998b; Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 1998; Feenstra, Markusen and Rose,
1999; Haveman and Hummels, 1997). On the empirical grounds, the challenge came from the
evidence that the gravity equation fits excellently also on the set of non-OECD countries, a
piece of evidence at odds with the assumptions of the IRS-MC paradigm (Hummels and
Levinsohn, 1995).
II.2 The Magnification Effect
The scope of the relevant empirical literature has until recently been limited by the lack of a
testable discriminating hypothesis that could serve to distinguish among theoretical paradigms
in statistically rigorous fashion. A major breakthrough in this direction came in a series of
papers by Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1998a, 1999). They developed a separation criterion
based on the feature of IRS-MC models that demand idiosyncrasies are reflected in the pattern
of specialisation more than one for one, thus giving rise to a magnification effect (pointed out
originally in Krugman, 1980). Conversely, in a CRS-PC model, there is no magnification effect.
Hence, with IRS-MC, a country will tend to export those goods on which it spends a larger
share of its income than the world as a whole, and import those on which it spends a relatively
smaller income share; and the reverse with CRS-PC. This feature can serve as the basis for
empirical investigation. Sectors that exhibit the magnification effect are associated with the
IRS-MC paradigm, while sectors that do not exhibit the magnification effect are associated with
CRS-PC. Davis and Weinstein have estimated the magnification effect empirically in data for
OECD countries (1996, 1998a) and for Japanese regions (1999), which allowed them to
5attribute industrial sectors to one of the two paradigms. In their first paper with international
data (1996) they have found little evidence of the magnification effect and therefore scant
support for increasing returns. However, in their later studies, which took account of cross-
border demand dissipation (1998a) and of region-level specialisation patterns (1999), they
produced evidence of pervasive magnification effects, suggesting that over half of industrial
output was in industries that conform with the IRS-MC paradigm.
The Davis-Weinstein test is intuitively compelling and marks a significant step in bringing
rigour to the empirical analysis of the new trade theory. Its major advantage is that it provides a
reduced form that is common to all model variants within the IRS-MC paradigm, and absent
from all models in the CRS-PC vein. Thus, it makes possible to distinguish between paradigms
without having to examine and compare each of the multidimensional features of each of the
paradigms (such as product differentiation or homogeneity, scale economies or constant returns,
perfect competition or imperfect competition, etc). Of course, the test should not be interpreted
literally, since no model in the CRS-PC or in the IRS-MC family is a precise description of any
real-world economic sector. Yet, we may think it reasonable to believe that each real-world
industry will resemble one of the two classes of models more than the other.
The magnification effect is only valid as a separation criterion if it is truly general to all (or to
“all reasonable”) models of one class and to none of the other. It is therefore important that this
discriminating criterion be subjected to theoretical as well as empirical “sensitivity tests”, so as
to explore its robustness and degree of generality. Some papers have pointed out limits to the
applicability of the magnification effect as a discriminatory criterion. Feenstra, Markusen and
Rose (1999) find that the magnification effect may be generated also in CRS models with
reciprocal dumping. Instead of the magnification effect they use a discriminating criterion
6according to which, in a gravity equation, the income elasticity of exports should be higher for
differentiated goods than for homogeneous commodities. Head and Ries (1999) also show that
the magnification effect can arise in settings that do not necessarily conform with the IRS-MC
paradigm.
Another aspect of the test based on the magnification effect is that it appears to be sensitive to
the modelling of trade costs. As outlined above, the empirical results of the two Davis-
Weinstein (1996, 1998a) studies on OECD data differ substantially as a result of different
assumptions about the effect of national borders on demand. In the purely theoretical context,
Davis (1998) has pointed out that the magnification effect hinges on the relative size of trade
costs in the CRS and IRS sectors, and that it vanishes if equal trade costs arise in both types of
sectors. Head and Ries (1999) have turned this sensitivity to trade costs into a useful feature.
They find that the size of the magnification effect increases with trade costs in CRS sectors and
decreases with trade costs in IRS sectors, and they use this feature as a discriminating criterion.
Our discriminating criterion does not depend on the presence of trade costs, and it remains valid
even if trade costs are zero. This is an attractive feature given the fragility of the magnification
effect with respect to assumptions about trade costs.
Turning to our contribution in this paper, we allow for the widely documented reality that goods
from different countries are ipso facto considered imperfect substitutes (the Armington
assumption), and that buyers are for a variety of reasons biased in favour of either home- or
foreign-produced goods.1 In such a model, a different type of home-market effect emerges, one
that arises from the relative degree of home bias in expenditure. Our theoretical result is as
                                         
1 Feenstra et al. (1999) and Head and Ries (1999) have used the Armington assumption in a similar context. Note
that we parametrise the home bias in the utility function instead of defining it in terms of the income elasticity of
imports, as in, e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller (1999).
7follows. In an IRS-MC setting, relatively strong home bias in a country’s aggregate expenditure
on a good will make the country relatively specialised in the production of that good; whereas
in a CRS-PC framework, relative home biases have no impact on the location of production.
This result forms the basis for our empirical separation criterion.
Our model hinges on the existence of home-biased demand. We argue that this is a sensible
claim, given the strong empirical evidence in its support. For example, Winters (1984) argued
that, while demand for imports is not completely separable from demand for domestic goods,
substitution elasticities between home and foreign goods are nevertheless finite. Davis and
Weinstein (1998b) and Trefler (1995) found that by allowing for home-biased demand the
predictive power of the HOV model could be improved very significantly. Head and Mayer
(1998) identify home bias in expenditure as one of the most potent sources of market
fragmentation in Europe. McCallum (1995), Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1996, 1997) find that
trade volumes among regions within countries are generally a multiple of trade volumes among
different countries even after controlling for geographical distance and other barriers. Finally,
Brülhart and Trionfetti (1998) find evidence of home bias in public procurement. The
assumption of home bias therefore seems to rest on solid empirical grounds.
III. THEORY: DERIV ATION OF A DISCRIMINATING CRITERION
A model suitable for our analysis needs to accommodate both the CRS-PC and the IRS-MC
paradigms. For this purpose, we use a framework close to that of Helpman and Krugman (1985,
part III).
8The world is composed of two countries indexed by i (i=1,2) and two homogeneous factors of
production indexed by V (V=L,K). Each country is endowed with a fixed and exogenous
quantity Li and Ki of the factors. L and K are used to produce three commodities indexed by S (S
=Y, X and Z). As will become clear below, the presence of trade costs results in the loss of one
degree of freedom. To assure factor price equalisation we therefore use a three-goods-two-
factors framework.
III.1 Technologies and Factor Markets
It is assumed that commodities Y and Z are produced by use of a CRS technology and traded in
perfectly competitive markets without transport costs. Commodity X is assumed to be subject to
an IRS technology and to trade costs. These trade costs are of the conventional “iceberg” type,
where for each unit shipped only a fraction t Î [0,1] arrives at its destination. The average and
marginal cost function associated with a CRS sector is cS(w,r), where w and r are the rewards to
L and K respectively. Production of X entails a fixed cost f(w,r) and a constant marginal cost
m(w,r). As usual, it is assumed that technologies are identical across countries. In order to make
factor intensities independent of plant scale, it is assumed that the functions m(w,r) and f(w,r)
use factors in the same relative proportion. Thus, factor proportions depend only on relative
factor prices. It is also assumed that there are no factor intensity reversals. The average cost
function in the X sector is cX(w,r,x) = m(w,r)+f(w,r)/x, where x is output. The number of
varieties of X produced in the world, denoted by N, and the number of varieties produced in
country i, denoted by ni, are determined endogenously. The industry-level demand functions for
L and K obtain from the cost functions through Shephard’s lemma and are denoted by lS(w,r)
and kS(w,r).
The efficiency conditions and factor-market clearing conditions are:
9( )rwcp SS ,= ,  S= Y, Z (1a)
( )rwmpX ,)/11( =- s , (1b)
( )xrwcp XX ,,= , (2)
( ) ( ) ( ) iiiXY LZrwlxnrwlYrwl =+ ,,, i = 1,2 (3a)
( ) ( ) ( ) iiZiXiY KZrwkxnrwkYrwk =++ ,,, i = 1,2 (3b)
where s is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of X. Equations (1a) and (1b) state the
usual conditions that marginal revenue equals marginal cost in all sectors and countries.
Equation (2) states the zero-profit condition in sector X i  all c untries. Equations (3a) and (3b)
state the market-clearing conditions for factors in all countries. These equations describe the
supply side of the model. Free trade assures commodity price equalisation for goods Y nd Z.
The f.o.b. price of X is the same across countries and the c.i.f. price is simply t/Xp .
III.2 Demand
Households’ preferences feature love for variety, represented by the traditional nested CES-
Cobb-Douglas utility function. We extend the basic model by assuming that household demand
is home biased. For simplicity, we model the home bias parametrically at the Cobb-Douglas
level of the utility function, and represent it by the parameter hiÎ[0,1]. This way of
parametrising the home bias is similar to Trionfetti (1999), but other structures are conceivable.
One alternative representation would be by inserting a parameter as a weight in the CES
aggregate. In Appendix 1 we show that the salient results also hold if the home bias is modelled
in this alternative form.
When hi=0, the household is not home biased. As hi increases the household becomes
increasingly home biased, and when hi=1 the household purchases only domestically produced
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commodities. Thus, the representative utility function for the consumer in country i is as
follows:
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Denoting with ESi the aggregate expenditure of households of country i on commodity S, we
have ESi = aSiIi , where Ii is aggregate income of households in country i (households have
claims on capital). Two-stage utility maximisation and aggregation over individuals yields the
aggregate expenditure of households of country i on each domestic variety of the commodity X.
The ratio åi SiSi EE /  is country i’s share of world demand for good S. This ratio represents
idiosyncratic demand and is the basis for the calculation of magnification effects.
III.3 Equilibrium in Product Markets
The equilibrium conditions in the product market require that demand equals supply for each
commodity and each variety. The market-clearing conditions are:
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where 1-= stq , and PXi  is the usual CES price index. Equation (4) states the equilibrium
condition for the varieties of IRS good produced in country 1, expression (5) states the
equilibrium condition for the varieties produced in country 2, and expression (6) states the
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equilibrium condition in the market for CRS good Y. By Walras’ law, the equilibrium condition
for the other CRS good Z is redundant. The model so far is standard except for the home bias.
The system (1)-(6) is composed of eleven independent equations and twelve unknowns (pX, pY,
pZ, x, n1, n2, Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2, w, r). Taking pZ as the numéraire, the system is perfectly determined.
In the absence of trade costs, equations (4) and (5) are not independent. Hence, a two-by-two
model would guarantee full dimensionality of the factor-price-equalisation set (eight
independent equations and nine unknowns). The presence of trade costs segments the market
for the differentiated commodity and, therefore, requires two equations for that market. Thus, in
the presence of trade costs, a two-by-two model would have too many equations for the factor-
price-equalisation set to be of full dimensionality. To restore full dimensionality we need one
more commodity. This is why we use a three-by-two model. While it is analytically convenient
to work within the factor-price-equalisation space, our results do not depend on its existence.
Under appropriate conditions, the dimensionality of the model could be extended to any V, S,
and i, with S >V.
III.4 A Discriminating Criterion
There is a difference between the two CRS-PC sectors and the IRS-MC sector that can be
immediately found by inspection of equations (4)-(6). The difference is that the parameter
representing the home bias cancels out of equation (6), while it does not cancel out in equations
(4) and (5). Hence, the home bias does not affect international specialisation in the CRS-PC
sectors but it affects international specialisation in the IRS-MC sectors. This is the essence of
our discriminating criterion. We associate sectors with the IRS-MC paradigm if the home bias
is significant in explaining international specialisation in the sector in question. Conversely, if
the home bias is not significant, we associate the sector with CRS-PC.
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It is useful at this point to rewrite equations (4)-(5) in terms of the ratios 21 /nnºh  nd
21 / XX EEºe .  This gives:
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It is well known that the roots of a third degree polynomial, especially when there are so many
parametrical coefficients, are unwieldy expressions. Fortunately, we can glean the fundamental
features of the model by simple inspection of (7), without having to use the explicit solutions.
To examine the relevant issues, we consider an exogenous idiosyncratic preference shock
21 XX ddd aaa -=º  that generates the idiosyncratic expenditure shock 21 XX dEdEd -=ºe .
1. The benchmark case. It is immediate that if demand is unbiased in both countries (i.e., if
h1=h2=0) then the left-hand side of (7) reduces to a first-degree polynomial whose solution
is: ( ) ( )qeqeh --= 1 . This is the benchmark case of the Davis-Weinstein studies, and it
has the property that 1/ >eh dd , i.e. it gives rise to a magnification effect. Since the
magnification effect is a feature of IRS-MC sectors and not of CRS-PC sectors, it has been
employed as a discriminating criterion. If trade costs in the IRS-MC sector are zero, the
discriminating criterion based on the magnification effect is no longer valid, because at
t=1 the derivative is zero for all paradigms.
2. No magnification effect in IRS-MC sectors. If demand is home biased, the derivative in
question is not necessarily larger than one for the IRS-MC sector. To show this, we should
differentiate (7) around each of the roots in the admissible range of h  and then evaluate the
size of the derivative at each admissible root. This is a complex procedure that we relegate
to Appendix 1. Here, we show a simple case that can be understood by inspection of (7).
Suppose that households in country 1 are not home biased while those in country 2 are
completely home biased (i.e., h1 = 0; and h2 = 1). Then, equation (7) reduces to a second-
degree polynomial whose only positive root is ( ) qeqh --= 1 . It is immediate that
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1/ <eh dd  in this case. In general, the effect of idiosyncratic demand can be offset by
idiosyncratic home bias. The fact that the derivative in question may be smaller than one
invalidates the generality of the magnification effect as a discriminating criterion.
3. Zero trade costs. A test based on home-biased demand, unlike one based on the
magnification effect, gives a discriminating criterion that is valid even in the absence of
trade costs. To see this it suffices to set 1=q in equation (7). This gives the unique solution
( )21 /hheh = . Clearly, in this extreme case, the home bias drives the pattern of
specialisation. Note that, if neither country is home biased (h1=h2=0), and there are no trade
costs, the solution is undetermined (0/0) and the derivative is zero in all paradigms. The
independence of our discriminating criterion from trade costs is a welcome feature. This is
not because trade costs are unimportant in reality, but because we have reduced the
sensitivity of the discriminating criterion to the way trade costs are modelled or measured.
4. The discriminating criterion. It is straightforward to show that 0/
021
>
>-=º dhdhdh
dhdh  for
any parameter value. Consider a symmetric change dh1=-dh2>0. As a consequence of the
change, the term on the right-hand side of (4) increases by
( )( ) ( ) 0/ 2121112112 >+++ -- XX EnnEnnnn qqqq . Since the left-hand side of (4) is constant,
the increase in the right-hand side requires an increase in n1 in ord r to satisfy (4). The same
holds, mutatis mutandis, for (5). This is true for any values of parameters and for any
associated solution of the system. The explicit solutions for most configurations are
extremely complex; but, as a useful example, the case of identical countries can be solved in
a manageable way. Setting 1=e  and h1=h2=h, then solving for h  and differentiating
around the solution we have:
( ) ( )[ ] 04114/ 2
021
>+-+=
>-=º
hdhd
dhdhdh
qqqqh ,
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which confirms a positive response of production shares to idiosyncrasies in the degree of
home bias.
We can use these findings to devise a discriminating criterion based on home biased demand.
Differentiating (7) around any of its solutions with respect to an idiosyncratic change
21 XX dEdEd -=ºe  and to a change 21 dhdhdh -=º  gives:
dhcdcd 21 += eh , (8)
where the coefficients c1 and c2 are the partial derivatives. Based on the fact that home biased
demand matters only for IRS-MC sectors we can derive the following discriminating criterion.
Sector S is IRS-MC if the estimated c2 is larger than zero, and CRS-PC if the estimated c2
equals zero. This discriminating criterion and its empirical implementation are the focus of this
paper. In addition, as discussed above, if trade costs are zero idiosyncratic demand does not
affect international specialisation. Accordingly, an estimated value of c1 larger than zero reveals
the importance of trade costs.
Association of Parameter Values with Paradigms in the New Test
c1 Trade costs c2 Paradigm
+ q < 1 + IRS-MC
+ q < 1 0 CRS-PC
0 q = 1 + IRS-MC
0 q = 1 0 CRS-PC
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IV. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
In operationalising our discriminating criterion, we need to proceed in two stages. First, we
estimate home biases across industries and countries. Those bias estimates can then be used as
an ingredient to the estimation of our testing equation (8).
IV.1 Estimating Home Bias
We estimated home biases across countries and industries using an augmented form of the
standard gravity equation. Thanks to the general compatibility of this approach with the major
theoretical paradigms, using of the gravity equation at the first stage of our exercise should not
prejudice the testing of theories in stage two.2 W  estimated variants of the following regression
equation:
tijijtij
ijijtijij
tijtijijtij
uCLOSEDDUMPTADUM
LANGDUMBORDUMLOGREMOTELOGDIST
LOGCGDPLOGGDPHOMEDUMLOGTRADE
,9,8
76,54
,3,21,
++
++++
++++=
bb
bbbb
bbba
, (9)
where the acronyms have the following meanings (for details on the construction of these
variables, see Appendix 2):
LOGTRADEij,t =log of (imports + exports) between countries i and j in year t,
HOMEDUM = dummy which is 1 if i=j, and zero otherwise,
LOGGDP = log of (GDPi*GDPj),
LOGCGDP= log of the product of per-capita GDP in i and j,
LOGDIST = log of geographical distance between the two countries,
LOGREMOTE =a measure of remoteness of i and j from the other sample countries,
                                         
2 On the generality of the gravity equation, see Davis and Weinstein, 1998b; Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller,
1998; Feenstra et al., 1999; Haveman and Hummels, 1997. The gravity model has been shown to be successful
even at the level of individual industries inte  aliaby Bergstrand, 1990; Davis and Weinstein, 1998b; Feenstra et
al., 1999; Head and Mayer, 1999.
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BORDUM = dummy which is 1 if i and j share a common border, and zero otherwise,
LANGDUM = dummy which is 1 if i and j share a common language, and zero otherwise,
PTADUM = dummy which is 1 if i and j are fellow members of a preferential trade
agreement,
CLOSEDUM = dummy which is 1 if at least one of the two countries was described as
“closed” by Sachs and Warner (1995).
The object of our interest is b1, the coefficient on trade within countries. A positive (negative)
coefficient is interpreted as positive (negative) home bias. By including variables for distance,
adjacency, language, PTAs and institutional obstacles to trade we aim to control for physical
transport costs, tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as for informational and marketing costs in
accessing foreign markets.3 To the extent that we manage to control for supply-side-driven cost
differentials between domestic and foreign suppliers through inclusion of these variables,
HOMEDUM will pick up the effect of home-biased demand.
The difficulties in implementing this approach are twofold. First, one has to find a measure of
“trade within countries”, and, second, the distance variable also has to be defined for intra-
country trade. Following Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1997), we define trade within countries as
output minus exports.4 The validity of this measure rests on the assumption that all output
recorded in the statistics is sold in a different location from its place of production, i.e. neither
consumed in situ nor used as an intermediate input in the original plant. The official definition
                                         
3 See Rauch (1999) on informational trade costs. Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) have shown that corruption and
imperfect contract enforcement can act as additional impediments to international trade. Data limitations do not
allow us to control for such factors. It seems plausible, however, that these effects will be less significant in our
OECD-dominated country sample than in their data set, which included a large share of developing countries. Note
also that we could invest greater confidence in our estimates if better measures of tariff and non-tariff barriers were
available, ideally at sector and year level. Unfortunately, such data do not exist for the time period analysed in this
paper.
4 Hence, LOGTRADEii,t = log(2*[Output-Exports]ii,t).
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of the “production boundary” in national accounts statistics supports us in making this
assumption: “goods and services produced as outputs must be such that they can be sold on
markets or at least be capable of being provided by one unit to another (…). The System [of
national accounts] includes within the production boundary all production actually destined for
the market” (OECD, 1999).
For estimates of “intra-country distances” we used the approach of Keeble, Offord and Walker
(1986) and Leamer (1997), who defined them as equivalent to a fraction of the radius of a circle
with the same area as the country in question.5 This method may appear crude, but Head and
Mayer (1999) found it to produce strikingly similar results to a more sophisticated approach
that could draw on regional data for the EU. The main weakness of this approach is its
sensitivity to the choice of divisor x, which is arbitrary.
Having constructed the intra-country variables, we estimated equation (9) on data for 29
industrial sectors, 22 OECD countries and 16 years (1970-85) drawing mainly on the OECD’s
COMTAP database as made available by Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen (1997). This yielded a
data set with over 212,000 year- and industry-level bilateral observations. A full description of
variables and data sources can be found in Appendix 2.
We began by running several variants of equation (9) on the entire data set. These results are
given in Table 1. First, we simply pooled the data and estimated our gravity equation using
OLS (column (1) of Table 1). With the exception of the border dummy, all our coefficients
have the expected signs and magnitudes and are statistically significant. A coefficient of 1.31
on HOMEDUM suggests that ceteris paribus a country’s trade with itself is on average 2.7
18
(=e1.31-1) times as large as trade with another country. This estimate may seem implausibly
high. However, it falls within the range of results found by Wei (1996) for aggregate trade
among a smaller OECD sample, which lie between 1.3 and 8.7, and it is identical to the
coefficient estimated by Helliwell (1997, Table 2 vii) in his most comparable specification.6
The magnitude of the estimated home bias is, however, sensitive to the way we proxy intra-
national distances. We have therefore experimented with different definitions of LOGDISTii.
LOGDIST1 (column (2) of Table 1) assumes intra-national distances to be equivalent to the full
radius of a circle with the country’s surface area, that is LOGDIST1 assumes larger average
intra-national distances than the default LOGDIST. As a consequence, the estimated home bias
increases to a factor 12.7 (=e2.62-1). The converse is true in the case of LOGDIST2, which
assumes smaller average intra-national distances than LOGDIST, using a divisor x of 6 (column
(3) of Table 1). With LOGDIST2, the estimated home-bias factor falls to 0.6 (=e0.48-1).
Obviously, we need to be careful in interpreting the absolute magnitude of the home-bias
estimates. Fortunately, this is not a problem in the context of our paper, since what we need in
order to apply our discriminating criterion is an estimate of relative home biases, and these are
unaffected by the definition of LOGDIST.
We have explored the robustness of our findings by applying different estimators. We ran a
Tobit model to take account of the censoring in our data set due to the omission of observations
with zero trade (column (5) of Table 1). This resulted in a slightly higher point estimate on
HOMEDUM than OLS (1.34 vs. 1.31), which should not surprise, given that intra-country trade
                                                                                                                             
5
 Hence, 
p
i
ii
Area
xLOGDIST
1= .
6 This figure might also seem at first sight to be incompatible with openness ratios (trade/GDP), which, in our
sample period, range between 0.14 (US) and 0.90 (Belgium).  However, it must be borne in mind that this is a
bilateral and conditional exercise. A coefficient on HOMEDUM of 1.31 suggests that, on average, a representative
agent facing two potential trade partners, one domestic and one foreign, will be 2.7 times more likely to trade with
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is defined in all industries, whilst zero observations only appear for inter-country observations.
In view of the small proportion of zero observations in our data set (0.6% of all observations)
and of the resulting marginal impact on coefficient estimates, we proceeded nevertheless to run
the disaggregated gravity regression using OLS.
We also ran fixed-effects and random-effects panel models with year dummies to relax the
restriction of identical intercepts across years, countries and sectors (columns (6) to (9) of Table
1). In this instance, we found that the size of the estimated coefficient on HOMEDUM was
substantially larger than in the pooled OLS run (1.44-1.56 vs. 1.31). Imposing identical
coefficients across the three dimensions of our panel is clearly restrictive. This result supports
our approach of estimating the gravity model at industry level. Hence, our next step was to run
equation (9) separately for each of the 638 country-industry observations (22 countries*29
industries), so as to get individual home-bias estimates. We used fixed-effects panel
regressions, allowing for variation in year intercepts. The resulting coefficients on HOMEDUM
are reported in Table 2. These numbers are crucial to our subsequent analysis. They are
empirical proxies for hi in our theoretical model, and therefore represent the key ingredient to
the empirical test of competing paradigms.
It is worth taking a look at the results in Table 2 in order to assess their plausibility. Average
home biases across countries are shown in the rightmost column. The highest averages appear
for ISIC 313 (beverages), 311 (food products) and 312 (food n.e.s.). Given the strong home bias
implied in most OECD countries’ agricultural policies, this seems plausible. The lowest home-
bias factors are found for ISIC 354 (petroleum and coal products), 372 (basic metal products)
and 353 (petroleum refining). The figures in the bottom row of Table 2 report average home
                                                                                                                             
the domestic partner, even after controlling for distance and other cost factors, but it does n t mean hat the
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biases across industries. The highest average home bias are those of Japan, Turkey and Greece,
and the lowest those of New Zealand, Australia and the Netherlands. However, the estimated
average coefficients for New Zealand (-23.7) and for Australia (-8.5) seem excessively low,
even though those countries are known to have particularly strong trade links with faraway
fellow OECD countries. Indeed, the magnitude of those estimates is extremely sensitive to the
construction of the remoteness measure (LOGREMOTE) in the gravity equation, which itself is
subject to a substantial degree of arbitrariness. We therefore felt compelled to drop observations
relating to these two countries from our data set for the subsequent estimations.
IV.2 An Empirical Test of the Discriminating Criterion
Having computed empirical estimates of countries’ home bias for each industry in our data set,
we could proceed to an implementation of the testing equation (8). We estimated the following
variant of this equation for each of the 29 industries s across all 22 countries i,j and 16 years t:
s
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21 being the number of countries in our sample, minus one.
                                                                                                                             
average openness ratio W should satisfy W=(1-W)/2.7=0.27.
21
According to our hypothesis, industries with estimated g3 of zero conform with the CRS-PC
paradigm, whereas industries with positive estimated g3 conform with the IRS-MC scenario.
The other variables are constructed equivalently to the Davis-Weinstein testing equation. In our
data set, IDIOBIAS and IDIODEM are not correlated (see Appendix 2).
Three issues warrant discussion. First, there is the question of sectoral disaggregation. Davis
and Weinstein have nested the IRS-MC model in an encompassing Heckscher-Ohlin framework
à la Helpman (1981). They assumed in most of their empirical specifications that factor
endowments determine specialisation at the “industry” level (2- or 3-digit statistical headings)
whilst the distinction between IRS-MC and CRS-PC is only relevant at the sub-industry level of
“goods” (3- or 4-digit headings). However, neither theory nor existing empirical work gives us
any strong priors as to the correct nesting of the theory. In our model, there is no hierarchy
between “industries” and “goods”. As a consequence, factor endowments do not appear in the
reduced-form testing equation (8). This is a result of the realistic assumption in our model that
there are more goods than factors, and it is a convenient feature in view of empirical
implementation.7
Second, situ is likely to be heteroskedastic, as the variance of errors may well be positively
correlated with the size of countries.8 Our significance tests are therefore based on
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors, using the residual variance estimator of
MacKinnon and White (1985). We make this conservative adjustment in order to minimise the
                                         
7 Note that Davis and Weinstein (1998a) found SHARE to be highly collinear with their endowment variables, and
therefore dropped it from their testing specification. Since we are doing the reverse, omitted-variable bias is likely
to be small. Another reason for working at a higher level of aggregation is that running the testing equation at the
level of 4-digit industries severely curtails degrees of freedom and therefore produces few robust results (see Davis
and Weinstein, 1996).
8 A Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity test on the pooled model strongly rejects the null of constant error variance.
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risk of wrongly attributing sectors to the IRS-MC paradigm due to underestimation of the
standard error of g3.
Third, we cannot rule out simultaneity of expenditure and output, and therefore bias in the
estimates of g1 and g2. The assumption underlying our test is that expenditure shares are an
exogenous determinant of output location. Some support for the assumption that demand
determines production and not the other way around is found in Davis and Weinstein (1998a, p.
29ff.) and in Trionfetti (1999).
IV.3 Results
We first ran our model on the pooled sample. This yielded the following point estimates:
Output = a + (1.2*108)*SHARE + 1.4 * IDIODEM + 0.0005 * IDIOBIAS + dt,
          [t = 21.5]      [t = 4.51]  [t = 3.51]
with 8920 observations and R2 = 0.46.
This gives us a preliminary indication about the importance of increasing returns. The
parameter estimate on IDIOBIAS is positive and significant. The coefficient on IDIODEM,
being larger than one, suggests presence of the magnification effect. However, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that g2 £ 1, hence the magnification effect is not statistically significant on
aggregate.9
We know a priori that pooled runs impose too much structure, since our fundamental
expectation is to find different parameter estimates for individual industries. The results of our
industry-by-industry regressions with year fixed-effects are given in Table 3. The equation
generally performs well, yielding R2s in the range 0.78 to 0.96. Coefficient estimates on
                                         
9
 This is true also if we drop IDIOBIAS from the estimating equation.
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IDIOBIAS are in the expected positive or insignificant range for all industries bar one (ISIC
332: furniture).
Again, we apply a conservative criterion for accepting the IRS hypothesis. We only reject the
null that g3=0 if the heteroskedasticity-adjusted t te  is significant at the 99% level. Using this
stringent criterion, we find that of the 29 industries, 17 conform with the IRS-MC paradigm, 11
conform with CRS-PC, and 1 produces a meaningless result (i.e. a significantly negative
estimated g3). The allocation of sectors looks broadly plausible. For instance, the four
“canonical examples” of increasing-returns industries according to Davis and Weinstein (1998,
1999) all belong to the IRS-MC category according to our exercise: textiles, iron and steel,
transport equipment, and instrument engineering.
It is interesting to measure the relative importance of the two paradigms in terms of percentage
of industrial output. IRS-MC sectors appear to account for nearly two thirds of industrial
production, the rest being accounted for by CRS-PC sectors. Precisely, the combined output
share of the 17 IRS sectors in our data set was 60.5% in 1970 and 63.9% in 1985, whilst the
output share of the 11 CRS industries amounted to 38.0% in 1970, and to 35.0% in 1985.
Some caution is of course warranted in the interpretation of our results. The sector with a
negative estimated g3 sounds a warning. Furthermore, some of our results are at odds with
informed intuition. For instance, it does not seem very plausible that ISIC 382 (non-electrical
machinery) is characterised by constant returns while, for instance, ISIC 323 (leather goods) is
driven by increasing returns. Overall, however, the association of sectors with paradigms
resulting from the empirical investigation seems quite plausible.
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A final comment is in order. Our estimates of the parameter g2 e consistent with those of
Davis and Weinstein (1996), namely, we do not find evidence of the magnification effect. Our
interpretation is different however. We do not interpret the absence of magnification effects as
validation of the CRS-PC paradigm, because, as discussed in the theory section, g2 ma  be
smaller than one in both CRS-PC and IRS-MC sectors when demand is home biased.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have developed and applied an empirical test which serves to separate the two principal
paradigms of international trade: models with constant returns and perfect competition (CRS-
PC), and models with increasing returns an monopolistic competition (IRS-MC). The test rests
on the assumption that demand is home biased, an assumption that is strongly supported by
empirical evidence. We show theoretically that specialisation patterns are affected by
intercountry differences in home bias if an industry conforms to the IRS-MC paradigm, but not
if it is characterised by CRS-PC. This finding provides us with a discriminating criterion that
we implement empirically. In the empirical part we estimate industry- and country-level home
biases through a gravity approach, and use these estimates to apply our test to a data set with 29
industries, covering 22 OECD countries in 1970-85. The results suggest that 17 industries,
accounting for almost two thirds of industrial output, can be associated with IRS-MC; 11
industries, accounting for little over one third of industrial output, can be associated with CRS-
PC; and for one industry the results are inconclusive.
A particularly fruitful generalisation of the theoretical framework would be to consider
Ricardian technological differences across countries. This undoubtedly important determinant
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of international trade and specialisation patterns deserves explicit consideration. On the
empirical side, two types of data would be useful in refining the work reported in this study.
First, availability of country- and industry-level measures of trade costs would allow greater
confidence that the coefficient on home dummies in the gravity equation picks up the residual
effect due purely to demand bias. Second, more sectorally disaggregated data would likely
make for better approximations of what constitutes a “good” in competing theoretical
paradigms.
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APPENDIX 1: THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS
1. No Magnification Effect in IRS-MC Sectors When D mand is Home Biased
We can show that the derivative h dd / is not necessarily larger than one when demand is
home biased. Let us define the left-hand side of (7) as a ( )qeh ,,,, 21 hhP . Unfortunately, in
general, the roots of this polynomial are long expression that are not manageable (not even with
math packages) except in the following two cases.
Case A: Identical Countries
Setting 1=e  and hhh == 21  the only positive root of the polynomial is 1=h . Differentiating
totally around this root gives:
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This derivative, although it is larger than one, i.e., it exhibit the magnification effect, it is
everywhere smaller than the derivative under the benchmark case, which is:
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Hence, home biased demand attenuates the size of the magnification effect.
Case B: Non-Identical Countries
In this example we drop the assumption of identical countries by assuming that only country 2
is home biased (i.e., 01 =h ) so that the polynomial ( )qeh ,,,, 21 hhP  reduces to a second-degree
polynomial. Differentiating around its only positive root gives:
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This expression is not particularly informative. Yet, after assigning specific values to one of the
three parameters, the expression can be plotted in a three-dimensional space. An example is in
Figure A1, where the expression for ( )2,, hd
d
eq
e
h  is compared with the constant 1. The figure
(computed at 1=e ) shows a large domain in which ( ) 1,1, 2 <hd
d
q
e
h , i.e., no magnification effect
exists.  Many other combinations of parameter values also yield no magnification effect.
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Figure A.1: An Example of the Domain with No Magnification Effect.
2. Home Bias in the CES Aggregate
The home bias may be inserted in the utility function also at the CES sub-utility level, for
instance in the following way.
( ) ( )
111 -
Î
-
Î
-
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+= åå
s
s
s
s
s
s
ba
ji nk
iji
nk
iikii ccu ,
where the weights represent the bias. Then, defining iiih ba /º , the market equilibrium
equations (compacted into one) for the IRS-MC product becomes
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which is not necessarily larger than one, even at1= . Hence, the magnification effect cannot
serve as a robust discrimination criterion here either.
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APPENDIX 2: DATA DESCRIPTION
Bilateral trade data are taken from the World Trade Database, and production data are from the
OECD Comtap database, both circulated by Feenstra et al. (1997). Since data recorded by the
importing countries were retained, all flows are c.i.f. Hence, our estimates of trade within
country can be considered conservative. Observations for which estimated intra-country trade
was, implausibly, negative (i.e. Output-Exports<0) were dropped from the sample. 366
observations, accounting for 0.48 % of total output and 3.73% of total trade in the full sample,
were thus omitted.
The following 22 countries are contained in our sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA, Yugoslavia.
A list of the 29 ISIC industries in our data set can be found in Table 3. Distance data measure
Great Circle distances between capital cities and are taken from Jon Haveman, Purdue
University (http://www.eiit.org/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html).
Inclusion of a remoteness variable in the gravity model has been advocated persuasively by
Polak (1996). LOGREMOTE is defined as follows (in the spirit of Helliwell, 1997):
]2[
, ,, å ¹ -+= jik tkjkiktij LOGGDPLOGDISTLOGDISTLOGREMOTE .
The linguistic groupings underlying LANGDUM are defined as follows:
English: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, USA; French: Belgium, Canada,
France; German: Austria, Germany; Dutch: Belgium, Netherlands; Scandinavian: Denmark,
Sweden, Norway.
The preferential trade areas underlying PTADUMare defined as follows:
EU: Belgium, Denmark (1973-), Greece (1981-), France, Germany, Ireland (1973-), Italy, UK
(1973-).
EFTA: Austria, Denmark (-1972), Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK (-1972).
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: Australia, New Zealand.
The dummy for trade “closedness” is from Sachs and Warner (1995). The dummy is set to zero
if a country satisfies four tests: (1) average tariff rates below 40 percent; (2) average quota and
licensing coverage of imports of less than 40 percent; (3) a black market exchange rate
premium that averaged less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s; and (4) no extreme
controls (taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on exports. It turns out that this measure is time
invariant in our data set. According to the Sachs-Warner criteria, New Zealand, Turkey and
Yugoslavia were “closed” for the whole time interval 1970-85, whilst the remaining 19
countries were “open” throughout this period.
Correlations among the variables of our testing equation (underlying Table 3, no. obs. = 9816):
Output SHARE IDIODEM IDIOBIAS
Output 1.000
SHARE 0.624 1.000
IDIODEM 0.219 -0.002 1.000
IDIOBIAS 0.287 0.364 -0.049 1.000
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TABLE 1: Gravity Equations: Full Sample
(22 countries, 29 sectors, 1970-85: 212,236 observations; dependent variable = log of imports+exports; beta values in brackets)
Pooled OLS Tobit Panel, fixed effects Panel, random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
HOMEDUM 1.31
(0.09)
2.62
(0.18)
0.48
(0.03)
1.85
(0.12)
1.34
(0.09)
1.56
(0.10)
1.44
(0.10)
1.53
(0.10)
1.44
(0.10)
LOGGDP 0.71
(0.46)
0.71
(0.46)
0.71
(0.46)
0.68
(0.44)
0.70
(0.46)
0.77
(0.50)
0.79
(0.51)
0.77
(050)
0.79
(0.51)
LOGCGDP 0.07
(0.18)
0.07
(0.18)
0.07
(0.18)
0.11
(0.30)
0.06
(0.18)
0.12
(0.33)
0.13
(0.36)
0.13
(0.34)
0.13
(0.36)
LOGDIST -1.20
(-0.51)
-1.50
(-0.64)
-1.17
(-0.50)
-0.91
(-0.39)
-0.93
(-0.39)
-0.90
(-0.39)
-0.93
(-0.39)
LOGDIST1 -1.20
(-0.47)
LOGDIST2 -1.20
(-0.54)
LOGREMOTE 0.02
(0.22)
0.02
(0.22)
0.02
(0.22)
0.04
(0.32)
0.02
(0.21)
-0.0002#
(-0.01)
-0.001
(-0.05)
-0.0005#
(-0.01)
-0.001
(-0.05)
BORDUM -0.002#
(-0.0002)
-0.002#
(-0.0002)
-0.002#
(-0.0002)
-0.02#
(0.002)
0.03#
(0.003)
0.23
(0.03)
0.22
(0.03)
0.26
(0.03)
0.22
(0.03)
LANGDUM 0.91
(0.10)
0.91
(0.10)
0.91
(0.10)
0.90
(0.10)
1.03
(0.12)
1.05
(0.12)
0.99
(0.12)
1.05
(0.12)
PTADUM 0.29
(0.04)
0.29
(0.04)
0.29
(0.04)
0.30
(0.04)
0.24
(0.03)
0.34
(0.05)
0.34
(0.04
0.34
(0.05)
CLOSEDDUM -0.95
(-0.12)
-0.95
(-0.12)
-0.95
(-0.12)
-0.91
(-0.11)
-0.66
(-0.09)
-0.64
(-0.09)
-0.54
(-0.08)
-0.64
(-0.09)
Year dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country
dummies
No No No No No Yes No (random ef.) No
Sector dummies No No No No No No Yes No (random ef.)
R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.58 n.a. 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
Note: All coefficients pass the t test at the 0.01% level, except those marked by #.
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TABLE 2: Estimated Home-Country Biases by Country and ISIC Industry, 1970-85
ISIC AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA JAP NOR NTH NZL POR SPA SWE TUR UK USA YUG Avg
311 0.83 2.61 1.84 6.47 2.65 5.37 4.94 2.11 9.11 1.76 1.19 17.39 3.80 1.55 -1.50 4.83 4.72 3.03 9.09 5.21 4.86 5.73 4.44
312 -8.97 n.a. 0.84 5.83 n.a. 3.58 3.37 2.13 n.a. n.a. 0.04 21.48 3.38 2.45 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.63 n.a. 2.85 3.69 n.a. 3.33
313 -8.40 3.54 3.33 6.24 6.23 3.47 4.79 1.86 9.85 -1.08 2.39 16.74 5.38 2.40 10.17 2.54 4.67 1.66 17.43 4.10 2.33 8.31 4.91
314 -27.60 3.52 -1.22 6.60 1.28 -0.09 2.96 -1.75 19.12 2.34 2.51 14.98 2.41 2.61 -78.78 6.35 7.61 2.69 n.a. 8.81 7.60 7.00 -0.53
321 -7.86 0.62 -0.20 5.48 0.43 2.15 2.73 1.19 8.33 -0.33 1.78 11.25 0.81 -2.10-21.15 4.41 4.80 0.89 6.12 3.66 3.36 4.28 1.39
322 -4.24 -1.67 -3.19 6.58 -2.72 -0.84 1.68 -1.39 3.55 -0.95 -0.91 4.00 -0.50 -4.44 2.91 3.34 5.01 -0.87 7.31 0.83 3.87 5.58 1.04
323 -8.77 -2.52 -1.58 3.93 -1.91 0.59 2.40 -0.89 5.92 3.68 -0.23 19.78 0.12 -1.44 -0.52 9.05 4.48 0.16 7.59 0.62 1.19 5.01 2.12
324 -2.12 -0.02 -2.77 4.34 -0.60 0.68 1.50 -1.13 10.33 2.15 -0.02 -1.68 0.14 -3.89 21.62 6.69 6.25 -1.66 9.61 1.44 3.20 6.11 2.74
331 2.84 -3.41 0.96 5.33 -0.38 1.66 1.35 0.03 2.69 -0.05 -0.51 31.08 1.68 -0.51-12.40 5.47 0.83 0.38 2.88 2.74 2.44 1.31 2.11
332 -0.60 -2.21 -1.15 4.55 -0.16 1.71 -0.07 -1.37 7.66 4.81 0.04 -5.04 1.57 -2.35 -8.39 6.64 3.30 -0.20 11.60 0.03 1.60 8.24 1.37
341 6.57 -1.86 -1.12 2.60 -0.28 3.86 1.20 0.41 3.00 -1.87 1.53 1.83 1.20 -0.75-32.70 1.21 0.73 1.35 6.76 1.64 0.77 4.45 0.02
342 -10.32 1.77 0.88 4.44 1.61 3.64 3.52 0.60 8.29 4.90 2.93 14.00 2.72 2.77 -21.98 8.52 4.52 2.54 9.19 4.91 3.20 7.50 2.73
351 -9.97 -0.91 -2.00 2.75 -1.43 1.92 1.17 1.17 2.95 0.17 0.20 14.63 0.24 -0.54-19.31 2.07 1.22 0.96 2.20 2.49 1.29 0.75 0.09
352 -12.56 1.84 0.89 4.88 -0.67 1.83 3.26 2.36 6.74 n.a. 1.28 20.62 1.76 0.02 -21.35 2.95 2.43 1.36 5.12 2.94 3.31 4.27 1.58
353 n.a. 4.53 -1.84 5.25 -1.94 3.61 1.07 0.15 4.39 -1.48 -1.72 27.92 0.89 -1.92-65.81 3.45 -0.91 -1.79 4.65 0.21 2.81 -0.78 -0.92
354 -4.02 1.07 0.87 4.98 -1.29 0.38 -5.26 0.04 3.78 n.a. -2.14 -11.13 1.48 -1.72-50.45 n.a. 1.54 1.14 9.37 2.60 1.99 4.16 -2.13
355 -12.14 1.23 0.09 6.54 -0.89 0.61 1.12 0.16 4.58 2.80 0.79 -9.18 -0.65 -1.04-19.28 5.36 3.22 0.32 6.31 2.11 1.48 3.32 -0.14
356 -5.45 0.73 1.00 5.07 -0.87 1.37 2.39 -0.40 7.07 2.24 1.43 11.67 1.42 0.54 -18.24 4.72 4.56 0.19 8.03 2.06 2.76 5.22 1.71
361 -17.27 0.26 2.17 7.87 0.59 1.90 2.19 -0.52 n.a. 4.27 0.75 1.53 1.93 -4.12-18.90 7.14 5.61 0.05 6.11 2.79 3.10 0.88 0.40
362 -6.13 2.51 -0.51 4.65 -0.91 1.41 2.38 0.94 2.57 3.44 0.11 14.24 0.59 -0.89-24.15 5.35 3.08 0.77 6.02 2.69 1.83 4.11 1.10
369 -11.44-0.11 0.80 5.88 1.72 2.95 2.13 0.94 5.66 5.70 0.30 12.21 2.65 0.77 -24.26 5.36 3.75 1.43 5.65 3.65 3.41 0.89 1.37
371 -10.55-1.49 -0.65 5.72 -5.05 0.57 0.04 0.10 7.20 0.50 0.27 7.10 -0.27 -2.41-39.77 6.41 2.06 0.41 4.73 2.70 2.05 1.61 -0.85
372 -8.40 -0.60 n.a. 3.82 -2.62 2.11 0.92 0.73 6.45 -1.47 -0.14 6.56 -0.09 -1.70-49.29 2.96 2.04 -0.01 6.99 1.26 0.15 3.29 -1.29
381 -5.75 0.55 0.40 5.23 -0.24 1.44 1.51 0.98 8.27 1.96 0.80 -0.56 1.06 1.48 -12.51 4.81 4.14 1.73 7.17 2.78 3.05 3.90 1.46
382 -7.51 -0.55 0.59 2.50 -0.46 1.31 1.23 0.05 4.30 1.19 0.53 -1.12 0.59 -0.40-17.93 2.75 0.55 0.92 8.21 1.24 1.22 2.69 0.09
383 -10.91-0.41 -1.23 4.51 -2.03 0.36 1.97 0.58 5.65 3.43 1.19 1.71 1.06 0.45 -30.70 5.02 1.42 0.92 6.90 2.88 2.04 3.91 -0.06
384 -15.20-1.42 -2.38 2.80 -1.37 -0.26 1.21 0.34 6.04 4.57 0.94 4.62 -0.52 -0.72-31.72 5.79 1.88 1.43 5.94 2.94 0.11 2.43 -0.57
385 -11.71 0.20 -0.83 3.26 -3.71 0.25 1.42 0.54 3.97 1.47 -0.50 6.12 -0.44 n.a. -31.19 0.89 0.98 0.37 5.09 1.69 1.51 2.60 -0.86
390 -9.94 n.a. n.a. 4.54 0.54 1.22 2.56 0.31 3.96 1.95 0.53 12.29 1.73 n.a. -23.72 n.a. 2.90 0.47 7.28 2.05 1.80 4.30 0.82
Avg -8.46 0.20 -0.30 4.86 -0.63 1.55 1.67 0.29 6.24 1.77 0.51 8.84 1.16 -0.67-23.70 4.77 3.06 0.72 7.09 2.53 2.40 3.90
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TABLE 3: Industry-by-Industry Estimation of the Discriminating Criterion
(OLS with year fixed-effects, dependent variable = OUTSHARE; normalised (beta) coefficients, t values in brackets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISIC Description
SHARE IDIODEM IDIOBIAS R2 No. of
obs.
Para-
digm
Output share
in 1970 (%)
Output share
in 1985 (%)
311 Food products 0.88 (11.34)* -0.16 (-1.77) -0.15 (-2.38) 0.90 320 CRS 10.9 10.1
312 Food n.e.s. 0.82 (10.39)* -0.06 (-0.79) 0.22 (3.62)* 0.89 192 IRS 2.1 2.2
313 Beverages 0.99 (11.92)* 0.21 (6.41)* 0.03 (0.52) 0.86 317 CRS 2.2 1.9
314 Tobacco 0.56 (5.31)* 0.30 (5.71)* 0.49 (5.36)* 0.93 288 IRS 1.2 0.9
321 Textiles 0.91 (10.37)* 0.10 (2.01) 0.18 (5.13)* 0.93 320 IRS 5.3 3.3
322 Clothing 0.61 (9.03)* 0.17 (7.35)* 0.34 (5.91)* 0.96 306 IRS 2.6 1.7
323 Leather goods 1.13 (9.35)* 0.43 (4.41)* 0.15 (4.58)* 0.84 320 IRS 0.4 0.3
324 Leather footwear 0.95 (17.87)* 0.19 (4.67)* -0.03 (-0.84) 0.83 311 CRS 0.6 0.4
331 Wood products 0.92 (10.19) 0.14 (1.90) 0.10 (1.45) 0.88 308 CRS 2.1 1.9
332 Furniture etc. 0.88 (7.77)* 0.02 (0.78) -0.12 (-3.68)* 0.87 320 ? 1.3 1.2
341 Paper products 0.36 (5.35)* 0.41 (10.28)* 0.41 (8.51)* 0.96 319 IRS 3.7 3.6
342 Printing and publishing 0.81 (9.51)* 0.23 (4.98)* 0.10 (3.14)* 0.87 320 IRS 3.7 3.8
351 Industrial chemicals 0.84 (7.92)* 0.02 (0.66) 0.12 (2.91)* 0.83 320 IRS 4.5 5.6
352 Other chemicals 0.83 (8.16)* 0.15 (7.14)* 0.10 (2.53) 0.87 304 CRS 3.5 3.6
353 Petroleum refining 0.40 (4.40)* 0.55 (5.86)* 0.35 (5.01)* 0.88 320 IRS 3.4 9.6
354 Petroleum and coal products 0.89 (9.71)* 0.30 (9.73)* 0.05 (0.77) 0.82 288 CRS 0.4 0.6
355 Rubber products 0.93 (13.36)* 0.04 (1.01) -0.07 (-1.30) 0.90 320 CRS 1.2 1.0
356 Plastic products 0.55 (4.42)* -0.38 (-2.33) 0.78 (4.05)* 0.88 320 IRS 1.5 2.2
361 Pottery, china etc. 0.82 (4.77)* 0.91 (43.53)* 0.33 (2.60) 0.78 304 CRS 0.2 0.2
362 Glass products 0.90 (10.60)* 0.04 (0.88) 0.07 (2.02) 0.89 320 CRS 0.7 0.7
369 Other non-metallic mineral pr.0.46 (4.78)* -0.16 (-2.43) 0.58 (7.83)* 0.94 320 IRS 2.3 2.1
371 Iron and steel 0.60 (6.61)* 0.18 (5.02)* 0.47 (7.15)* 0.95 320 IRS 6.4 4.9
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.82 (8.75)* 0.15 (3.36)* 0.12 (2.79)* 0.90 304 IRS 2.8 2.3
381 Fabricated metal products 0.79 (10.63)* 0.24 (5.99)* 0.09 (1.69) 0.91 320 CRS 6.7 5.7
382 Non-electrical machinery 0.86 (9.93)* 0.09 (2.30) 0.02 (0.28) 0.86 320 CRS 9.5 8.9
383 Electrical machinery 0.20 (3.20)* 0.29 (15.86)* 0.65 (10.93)* 0.96 320 IRS 7.3 7.4
384 Transport equipment 0.49 (5.10)* 0.37 (5.50)* 0.38 (6.54)* 0.93 320 IRS 10.8 11.2
385 Instrument engineering 0.46 (6.21)* 0.37 (5.79)* 0.21 (3.35)* 0.93 304 IRS 1.4 1.8
390 Misc. manufactures 0.73 (9.81)* 0.16 (2.82)* 0.16 (5.19)* 0.92 255 IRS 1.1 1.0
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level. t statistics are calculated on the basis of MacKinnon-White (1985)
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
